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child., 3 Furthermore, it
the child voluntarily has
of child support imposed
the possibility that such
child.

should be noted that the mother's ability to abort
in no way added to the previously existing burden
by law on the father. It has, in fact, merely reduced
a burden will ever arise through the birth of the

CONCLUSION

The Wade and Danforth decisions have resulted in a questioning of the
traditional relationship between the duty of a father and a mother to provide
support for their children. The courts have emphasized the mother's exclusive
right to an abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy by denying the
father any right to veto such an abortion. Consequently, the mother has
primary control over the birth of the child. Thus, it could be argued that
the mother should also have the primary responsibility to support a child
she elects to bear. This responsibility would include the right to release the
father by contract from any legal duty to support the child.
To allow the mother the right to grant such a release, however, could
result in a subsequently born child becoming dependent on state welfare if
the mother becomes indigent. In the face of such an undesirable result, the
state should exercise its power as parens patriae to protect the contingent
right of the unborn child to paternal support. In any balancing of interests,
it is likely that the state's interest in protecting its coffers combined with the
paramount interest of the child in obtaining support will outweigh the interests
of the mother and father in exercising their contractual freedom.
The trend toward equality for women in employment and other areas
of the law dictates that the burden of child support fall equally on the
shoulders of both parents. However, when the situation arises in which the
mother is unable to provide support, economic realities should preclude the
state from allowing the father to escape liability for support of his child
through a release improvidently signed by the mother.
MARTY ANDERSON

RULE lOb-5: LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING AFTER
ERNST & ERNST V. HOCHFELDER
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was enacted by Congress to protect
the investing public by providing regulation of the securities trading
an interest in the procreation potential of his marriage." Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787,
795 (5th Cir. 1975).
113. "The obligation of progenitors to support their offspring is universally
acknowledged." Denning v. Star Pub. Co., 94 Ind. App. 300, 308, 180 N.E. 685, 687 (1932).
1. 15 U.S.C. §§78a-jj (1970).
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markets.2 Section 10(b) of the Act,3 an antifraud provision, provides investors
with a private cause of action for damages" and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) with injunctive powers to prevent securities violators
from perpetrating additional fraud.5 Originally, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, 6
which was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), were aimed at individuals
who were primary participants 7 in the fraud.8 The scope of the section and
the rule, however, has been expanded to include the imposition of secondary
liability 9 on individuals who are not primary participants in a securities
fraud. 10 As the Supreme Court noted in a 1975 decision, rule lOb-5 has become
"a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.""
Individuals charged with secondary liability under an aider and abettor theory
include attorneys, 12 accountants,' 3 and brokers. 4 This commentary analyzes the
2. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
3. Section 10(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970).
4. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971). The
Supreme Court has declined to address whether a private cause of action will lie against
aiders and abettors under rule lOb-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1380
n.7 (1976).
5. 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
6. Rule lOb-5 provides: "IT shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5

(1975).
7. Primary liability under rule lOb-5 generally requires three elements: conduct by the
defendant proscribed by the rule, a purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiff in connection with such proscribed conduct, and resultant damages to plaintiff. See, e.g., Woodward v.
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURrIEs LAwS
(1975).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). In view of section 10(b)'s importance today, it is surprising
that the section received little attention or discussion when it was first enacted. See 1 A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAv §2.2(331) (1975); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions
Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C. L. REv. 482, 496-97 (1970).
9. Secondary liability is imposed under concepts borrowed from common law principles
of agency and criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
10. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delecto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597
(1972).
11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Note,
An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private Counselors
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current status of aider and abettor liability under rule IOb-5 in light of the
1976 Supreme Court decision, Ernst & Ernst v. HochfelderAIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY

Although several courts had recognized that individuals often aid and
abet securities violations as secondary participants in a fraud,6 doubt initially
existed as to whether section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 applied to such secondary
participants. Defendants asserted that the rejection of amendments to section
10(b) explicitly providing for secondary liability indicated a congressional
intent to exempt aiders and abettors. 7 Lower courts have rejected this
assertion, however, and have held aiders and abettors liable under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5.18
In defining the term "aider and abettor," courts have generally relied on
section 876 of the Restatement of Torts"' This section has been interpreted
to require three elements: the commission of a wrong by a person other than
the accused, knowledge of the wrong committed by the accused, and the
rendering of substantial assistance to the accused who commits the wrong.2 0
While this test provides a general framework within which to operate, it
leaves several important questions unanswered. For instance, to what extent
must knowledge of the primary participant's actions be shown? Is knowledge
of the primary participant's actions enough, or must knowledge of the
illegality be shown? What is the nature of the assistance required?21 In response
to these questions, many of the circuits have formulated their own interpretation of the three general requirements of the Restatement. These various
interpretations have created significant confficts among the circuits as to what
evidence is required to hold a person liable as an aider and abettor.
or Public Servants?, 61 CALmF. L. REv. 1189, 1220-28 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). See generally Fiflis, Current
Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties,28 VAND. L. REv. 31 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960

(1974).
15. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976) (Blackmun & Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.
Ind.) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (1968) (on merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1969); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F.

Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
17. See, e.g., 259 F. Supp. at 677-78. For a list of some of the amendments passed
by the Senate in 1960 but never acted on by the House, see 1 L. Loss, SECURrrES REGULATION
205-06 n.80 (2d ed. 1961).
18. 259 F. Supp. at 680; 217 F. Supp. at 28.
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTs §876(b) (1939) provides in part: "[F]or harm resulting to
a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . .. (b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other . . . :
20. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973); Saltzman v. Zern,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,521 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 1976); H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg,
CCH FFa. SEc. L. REP. 95,380 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1975). The Supreme Court has declined
to decide, however, what elements are necessary for aider and abettor liability. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 95 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 n.7 (1976).
21. These questions are posed by Ruder, supra note 10, at 623.
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Independent Wrong
The circuits uniformly held that a wrong must have been committed by
someone. 22 Generally, the problem of identifying the wrong is not a difficult
task; nevertheless, the alleged wrong must be specifically identified since
such identification is critical in determining who will be subject to potential
aider and abettor liability.22 In addition, the wrong must involve a violation

of the securities laws. Unless a violation is proved, no aider and abettor
liability will attach regardless of the secondary participant's intent.24 It is
not essential, however, that the aider and abettor know the identity of the
primary participant.25
Knowledge of the Wrong's Existence
The state of mind required to impose primary or secondary liability
has been the subject of considerable discussion and disagreement among
commentators. 26 The debate has revolved around the issue of whether scienter
must be shown before rule lOb-5 liability is imposed. The term "scienter'"
has been employed in numerous securities cases to describe conduct ranging
from various gradations of recklessness

to knowing falsity.2 7 In

Ernst &

2s

Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court described scienter as a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Thus, scienter
involves more than mere knowledge of the existence of the wrong. Knowledge
of the wrong is the critical focus, however, since an intent to deceive, defraud,
or manipulate will often be inferred if knowledge is combined with other
actions, such as rendering substantial assistance in the commission of a
2 9

securities fraud.

By the early 1970's, court decisions were apparently in agreement that
something more than negligence was essential to impose aider and abettor
liability under rule lOb-5.' In 1974 the Seventh Circuit, a leader among circuits in giving rule lOb-5 an expansive reading, 31 held that negligent inaction
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1973).
23. Ruder, supra note 10, at 630.
24. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 970 (2d Cir. 1969)
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 909 (1970).
25. United States v. Blitz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,484 (2d Cir. March 25, 1976). In
this case a salesman involved in a large scale market manipulation was found liable under
a rule lOb-5 aider and abettor theory even though he could not name the primary
participants.
26. See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Epstein, The
Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C. L. REv. 482 (1970).
27.

See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIE

REGULATION 1432 (2d ed. 1961).

28. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1375 n.12 (1976).
29. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05 (3d Cir. 1973); Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1962).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
31. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974), in which Ihe Seventh Circuit held, contrary to the widely accepted
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on the part of independent auditors of a brokerage firm was sufficient to
impose aider and abettor liability under rule lOb-5. 32 In that case,
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,33 plaintiffs were induced by the president of a
company to deposit funds in an escrow account that was later found to be
spurious. During an audit of the company's financial statements, Ernst &
Ernst employees failed to investigate the company's policy that all mail was
to be opened only by the president.34 Plaintiff investors claimed that this
practice constituted a serious deficiency in internal control and that Ernst &
Ernst breached a duty to the investors by failing to scrutinize the mail
policy.35 In reversing the district court, which had granted defendants summary
judgment,31 the Seventh Circuit held that scienter was not a requirement for
liability under rule l0b-5; 37 instead, the court premised liability on a breach
of a duty of inquiry. 8 In substance, the Seventh Circuit replaced the scienter
standard with a negligence standard.39 In reaching this result, the Seventh
Circuit relied heavily on the remedial nature of section 10(b). 40 The court
reasoned that since the purpose of the 1934 Act is to protect investors,""
section 10(b) should encompass negligent as well as intentional conduct. 42

Birnbaum doctrine, that an investor need not be an actual seller or purchaser to receive
the protection of rule lOb-5. The basis of that decision was eventually rejected in Blue
Chip. For a discussion of the Birnbaum doctrine, see note 82 infra.
32. 503 F.2d 1100 (1974). See generally Comment, Securities Regulation -Securities
Fraud-Accountants and Accounting-An Independent Public Accounting Firm is Liable
to Injured Investors for Aiding and Abetting a Violation of Rule 10b-5 If It Is Negligent
in Performing an Audit Pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
28 VAND. L. Rav. 269 (1974).
33. 503 F.2d at 1100.
34. This breach was found to violate §17 of the 1934 Act and rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R.
§240.17a-5 (1975). Section 17 requires that brokers "make . . . such accounts . . . books,
and other records . . . as the Commission . . . may prescribe . . . for the protection of
investors."
35. See Auditing Standards and Procedures, Statements on Auditing Procedures No.
33, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 10-11 (1963). This was the procedure Ernst & Ernst allegedly breached.
36. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1103 n.1 (7th Cir. 1974).
37. This was the second Seventh Circuit decision to hold that scienter was not a
requirement for rule lob-5 aider and abettor liability. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
38. The Seventh Circuit found that five elements must be satisfied to impose rule
lob-5 liability: the defendant was under a duty of inquiry; plaintiff was a beneficiary of
that duty; plaintiff breached the duty of inquiry; defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and a causal connection existed between plaintiff's loss and defendant's actions.
503 F.2d at 1104. The court noted the existence of two different duties of inquiry,
statutory and common law. In this case the duty of inquiry was found to be statutory.
See note 34 supra.
39. See generally Comment, supra note 32, at 269.
40. The court relied on Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972) and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), in which the Supreme Court
emphasized that section 10(b) was a remedial provision that should be interpreted broadly.
41. See S. RP'. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934).
42. This contention was voiced by the dissent in Iiochfelder. 96 S. Ct. at 1392-93
(Blackmun & Brennan, J.J., dissenting). The dissent, noting that the invetor is harmed
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Flatly rejecting this effect-oriented analysis of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
the Supreme Court noted that "the starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute isthe language itself." 43 Pointing out that the key
words in section 10(b) are "manipulative" and "deceptive," 44 the Court found
that more than negligence was needed to violate section 10(b) or rule 1Ob-5. 45
The scienter element was generally required by the majority of circuits to
impose aider and abettor liability before the Hochfelder decision. 46 This position is illustrated by a Fifth Circuit decision, Woodward v. Metro Bank,47
in which the court expressed concern that a person might know of a violation
without being a part of it. Since the Fifth Circuit considered participation to
be the key to aider and abettor liability, its aider and abettor test required
that the accused be generally aware of his role in the improper activity. 4s
The degree of awareness required depended on the participant's relationship
to the primary violation or violator. 49 While the Supreme Court decision on
scienter will prevent the great expansion of rule IOb-5 that would have occurred
if the Seventh Circuit holding in Hochfelder had been upheld, it should not
significantly affect prior aider and abettor case law in the majority of circuits.50

In light of recent Supreme Court rule lOb-5 cases, the result reached in
Hochfelder was predictable; 51 however, the Court's mode of analysis in
just as severely by negligent conduct, deemed it illogical to assume that Congress intended
to draw a dichotomy between the two types of conduct. Id. at 1392.
43. Id. at 1383.
44. The Court found the svord "manipulative" to be especially significant since it is a
term of art when used in connection with the securities markets. The Court noted that
manipulative "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Id. at 1384.
45. In holding that §10(b) requires more than negligence, the Court rejected the
interpretation of several courts that the primary emphasis should be on the word "any"
in "any . . . deceptive device." Those courts had taken the view that the word "any"
does not distinguish between negligent and knowing actions. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Associates, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 876 (S.D.
Fla. 1974).
The Court also rejected the SEC's contention that subsections (2) and (3) of rule
lob-5 contain language that could encompass negligent conduct. The Court noted that
the rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency is not the power to make
law. Thus, the Commission's rulemaking power concerning rule lOb-5 is governed by
§10(b), the wording of which makes it clear that negligence is not enough. For a discussion
of why the interpretation of rule lOb-5 must be within the scope of §10(b) to be valid,
see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3884 (2d ed. 1961).
46. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
47. 522 F.2d 84 (1975).
48. This element has been required by several other courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1973); H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP.
195,380 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1975).
49. Under this analysis, the requisite degree of awareness is greater when the activity
is more remote. At some undefined point, the court felt that fairness required that a
remote party not only be aware of his role in the violation but also know when and
to what degree he is furthering the fraud. 522 F.2d at 97.
50. See text accompanying note 46.
51. See notes 81-82 infra.
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Hochfelder is inconsistent with that used in the recent Blue Chip Stamp v.
Manor Drug Stores52 decision. In Blue Chip the Court first looked to the
language of section 10(b)53 but concluded that judicial expansion of rule
lOb-5 had gone far beyond what Congress had intended when section 10(b)
was enacted. The Court then noted that policy considerations are often the
guiding light in determining the limits of liability under rule l0b-5.5 4
Surprisingly, the Court refused to address these extrinsic considerations in
Hochjelder, focusing exclusively on the language of the statute and the
congressional intent behind its promulgation. 55 In light of the general
acknowledgment that Congress never intended a private cause of action under
section 10(b), 5 3it is surprising that the Court would conclude that the statute
is explicit in that it precludes a consideration of policy factors. This shift
to a strict construction of the statute without regard to current policy considerations may reappear when the Court is faced with other issues involving
interpretation of the 1934 Act.57
Despite the shift in analysis, the Hochfelder decision dearly held that
simple negligence is insufficient to form a basis of liability under rule 10b-5
in private actions for damages. Yet, the Supreme Court expressly failed to
address two important issues: whether the scienter requirement may be
satisfied by a showing of reckless conduct and whether scienter is a necessary
element in an injunctive proceeding under rule l0b-5. 59 While Hochfelder
will obviously be well-received by professional groups who have been
52. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
53. Id. at 731-36.
54. Id. at 739-40. One of the policy considerations facing the Court was the possibility
of vexatious litigation if the scope of rule lob-5 was greatly expanded. The Blue Chip
Court was especially concerned that plaintiffs might bring spurious lawsuits solely for
their settlement value, a practice that would seriously disrupt business activity. The
Court was concerned also that the abolition of the Birnbaum doctrine would introduce
hazy issues of historical fact that would be dependent on unreliable oral testimony. For
a discussion of the Blue Chip holding and Birnbaum doctrine, see note 82 infra.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 1391 n.33. Although expressly declining to address policy considerations,
the Court stated that: "While much of the development of the law of deceit has been
the elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not the first
court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may
sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good." Id. (quoting
421 U.S. at 747-48). This statement suggests that outside considerations might have been
a factor in the decision despite the Court's statement to the contrary.
56. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
57. For instance, there has been considerable disagreement among the circuits as to
whether §20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an exclusive remedy of
liability for controlling persons or whether it is complementary with common law
principles of agency. This exclusivity question is of vital importance because §20 provides
a good faith defense not available under agency principles. Since the language of §20
draws no distinction between controlling persons acting under an agency relationship and
those persons who do not act under an agency relationship, the Supreme Court should
find §20(a) to be an exclusive remedy. However, strong policy factors, if considered, could
enable the Court to reach a different result. See generally Comment, Vicarious Liability
for Securities Laws Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling Person Sections,
15 Wss. & MARY L. Ray. 713 (1974).
58. 95 S. Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976).
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threatened by increasing rule lOb-5 litigation, 59 broad judicial answers by
the lower courts to the unresolved issues could nevertheless create serious
problems for those groups.
As stated previously, scienter has been used to describe a variety of conduct
short of simple negligence. 60 Because of the varying factors in particular
cases, courts have had difficulty establishing a specific standard to govern the
gray area between fraudulent intent and simple negligence.6 ' Prior to
Hochfelder, several courts indicated that individuals charged with rule 10b-5
liability would not be allowed to rely on a scienter defense when it could be
shown that the individuals had ignored obvious warning signals. 62 In those
cases, the individual's failure to investigate the warnings was found to
constitute reckless conduct in violation of rule lOb-5. Whether such reckless
conduct will be found sufficient to impose rule 10b-5 liability after
Hochfelder is an open question.
Until the Supreme Court establishes a definitive standard, lower courts
retain some flexibility; however, it could be contended that the Supreme Court
has at least narrowed the type of reckless conduct sufficient to impose liability.
In Hochfelder the Court refused to grant a remand, noting that since
plaintiffs had proceeded on a theory of liability based on negligence, justice
would not be served by subsequently allowing plaintiffs to proceed on a
different theory of liability. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that
the plaintiffs had only charged the defendants with "inexcusable negligence." 63
In refusing to decide whether reckless conduct may satisfy the scienter requirement, the Court apparently implied that inexcusable negligence does not
constitute reckless conduct.. Thus, pre-Hochfelder lower court decisions that
defined recklessness as encompassing such conduct 64 may be weak precedent.
59. In its amicus brief in Hochfelder, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants contended that the Seventh Circuit holding would "impose upon accountants
insupportable burdens in the performance of the audit function, would attach to
negligent noncompliance with generally accepted auditing standards sanctions in the
form of vast monetary recoveries which were never in the contemplation of the profession at the time these standards became generally accepted, would open the door to
vexatious litigation brought on the basis of hindsight criticism of the elements of
sampling and judgment inherent in the audit process, and would shape a role of conduct
so imprecise and burdensome as to form no useful guide for courts or auditors in the
performance of their respective functions." BNA S~c. REG. L. REP. No. 331, A-13 (Dec. 10,
1975).
60. See note 27 supra.
61. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 396-98 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
62. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 n.8 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 59 5 , 38 0 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 8, 1975). See also Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 568-70 (1972);
Ruder, supra note 10, at 634-36.
63. 96 S.Ct. at 1380 n.5.
64. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973). While several
courts have held that recklessness is insufficient to impose liability, recklessness has
not been clearly defined in rule lob-5 cases. See 2 A. BROMBSERG, SEcuRiTiEs LAW §8.4(570)
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On the other hand, if the Court were ultimately to decide that reckless
conduct may constitute scienter, it would be dangerous for defendants to rely
on Hochfelder's narrow interpretation of reckless conduct since recklessness
involves factual determinations.65 The Eochfelder Court noted that investors
were not foreseeable users of the financial statements prepared by Ernst &C
Ernst.6 6 Since foreseeability of potential injury is often a major element of

recklessness,67 the Court might find inexcusable negligence sufficient to
constitute reckless conduct if the plaintiffs were foreseeable users. In summary,
although simple negligence alone is not a sufficient basis for rule lOb-5
liability in a private action for damages, potential defendants would be wise
not to place great reliance on Hochfelder until the recklessness issue is resolved
and until the definition of recklessness is more dearly delineated.
The other issue left unanswered in Hochfelder is the standard of conduct
for injunctive relief against individuals charged with aider and abettor
liability. In the past, when injunctive relief rather than damages was sought,
courts have indicated that a lower standard of liability may be applied. 68 In
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,6 9 for instance, the Second Circuit held that if an
individual knew or should have known of his involvement in a fraudulent
scheme but for negligence on his part, injunctive relief may be granted
against him as an aider and abettor under rule lOb-5. In Spectrum plaintiffs
claimed that an attorney who had written a misleading opinion letter should
(1975). The Lanza court, however, noted that: "In determining what constitutes 'willful
or reckless disregard for the truth,' the inquiry normally will be to determine whether
the defendants knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused,
after being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves
of the facts where they could have done so without any extraordinary effort. The answer
to the inquiry will of course depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature and duties of the corporate positions held by the defendants." 479 F.2d
at 1306. Because this definition encompasses the duty of inquiry concept rejected by the
Hochfelder Court, 96 S. Ct. at 1391, it is unlikely that this definition of recklessness
would be accepted, even if the Supreme Court should find recklessness sufficient to impose
rule lOb-5 liability. For a discussion of the Lanza court's definition of recklessness, see Note,
Securities Regulation - Rule lOb-5: Development of an Inquiry Standard of Conduct in
the Second Circuit, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 441, 450-53 (1974).
It is clear that recklessness in a nonsecurity context is often held to encompass inexcusable or gross negligence. See, e.g., Robinson v. Helena Light & R.R., 38 Mont.
222, 241, 99 P. 837, 843 (1909) (conduct that is rash or careless); Bernard v. Heather, 135
Neb. 513, 517-18, 282 N.W. 534, 537 (1938) (conduct amounting to more than negligence).
65. See text accompanying notes 63, 64. In a recent decision, the Delaware federal
district court held that "knowing conduct" by an accountant short of actual intent to
defraud is sufficient for rule lOb-5 liability. The accountant's conduct was found to
constitute "both actual knowledge of material facts not revealed and reckless disregard
for the truth." McLean v. Alexander, CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 95,725 (D.C. Del. Aug. 13,
1976). Thus, at least one post-Hochfelder court has held that reckless conduct is sufficient
to impose rule lob-5 liability.
66. 96 S. Ct. at 1391 n.33 (1976).
67. See PROssER, JAW OF TORTS §34, at 184-86 (4th ed. 1971).
68. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972).
69. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371.
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have known that the letter could be used to sell unregistered securities in
violation of the 1933 Securities Act. Although the Second Circuit found the
attorney liable under a negligence theory, it is uncertain whether such a result
70
can now be reached in light of the Hochfelder decision.
It has been suggested that the policy justification for requiring scienter
is less compelling in SEC injunctive actions.1 Such a view is based on the
belief that the public benefit obtained from SEC injunctive actions outweighs
the harm to legitimate business activity.72 The Supreme Court is apparently
sensitive to these policy considerations. 3 Nevertheless, because of the Court's
recent emphasis on the literal language of section 10(b), which draws no
distinction between damage actions and injunctive actions, consistency of
analysis requires the Court to decide ultimately that the same standard is
74
applicable in both types of actions.
The proposition that the public benefit derived from injunctive actions
will outweigh any harm to business activity is of questionable validity,
especially in light of the severity of SEC sanctions. For example, rule 2(e)
of the SEC's Rules of Practice states:

70. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
71. 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).
72. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965), in which the court stated that "the aim of administrative proceedings under
rule lOb-5 is to deter misconduct by insiders, rather than to compensate their victims."
Similar views have been expressed as to the role of SEC injunctive actions. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the divergency
in policy between disciplinary and compensatory proceedings, see Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1965).
73. Because the Court was focusing its analysis on the language of rule lOb-5, it
could have easily decided that the rule requires scienter for both private and injunctive
actions.
74. The dissent in Hochfelder found "no distinction between that situation [injunctive
proceedings] and this one [private actions], for surely the question whether negligent
conduct violates the rule should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity. If negligence
is a violation factor when the SEC sues, it must be a violation when a private party
sues." 96 S. Ct. at 1392.
Two recent post-Hochfelder courts have agreed with the dissent. In SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1976), the court held that
"the Hochfelder -holding must be read to impose a scienter requirement in this suit
for injunctive relief brought by the SEC. Although not obliged to reach the question by
the facts of that case, the Supreme Court used reasoning which appears to compel the
result." If this decision is ultimately allowed to stand, it would probably signify a postHochfelder shift by the Second Circuit from its widely cited SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. decision. See note 69 supra. Accord, Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., BNA SEC. REG. L. REP.
No. 361, A-24 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1976), (scienter is a necessary element for injunctive
relief under rule lOb-5).
Cf. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. No. 377, 1-1 (Ist Cir.
Nov. 4, 1976). The court held that scienter is not required for SEC injunctive actions
since injunctive relief is designed to protect the public against conduct and not to
punish a state of mind. However, the court expressly declined to address whether their
decision was based on an interpretation of rule lob-5 or section 17(a). Id. at 1-3 n.10.
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The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and without
preliminary hearing, may by order temporarily suspend from appearing
or practicing before it any attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional expert who, on or after July 1, 1971 has been by name:
a) permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction by
reason of his misconduct in an action brought by the Commission
from violation or aiding and abetting the violation of any provision
of the Federal securities laws.7 5
If such available sanctions are vigorously imposed, the impact of injunctive
actions on legitimate business activity can be just as harmful 's the result
of a damages award.78
Even assuming that public policy justifies lowering the scienter standard
for injunctive actions, there is a strong justification for relaxing the state
of mind requirement only in cases involving primary liability. 77 While the
goal of investor protection might require a primary participant to exercise a
stringent duty of care with respect to his actions, it does not seem to require
such a duty of those who are involved only secondarily with the violation. If
secondary participants were held to such a duty, business prudence would
require them to investigate independently the activities of their clients, a
practice that would entail an unnecessary waste of time and expense. Although
no courts have specifically addressed these policy distinctions, two circuits
have implicitly recognized the difference by requiring scienter to prove
78
secondary but not primary liability.
The ultimate answer to the recklessness and injunctive relief questions
may depend on the lower courts' responses to the Hochfelder decision. By
leaving these two avenues open, the lower courts and the SEC may impose
sanctions against individuals whose actions are proscribed dearly by rule
10b-5 even if scienter cannot be shown. If the lower courts and the SEC
utilize these approaches wisely, the Supreme Court may eventually determine
that recklessness is sufficient to impose rule 10b-5 liability and that
negligence may be the basis of an SEC injunctive action.79 The lower courts
75. 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e) (1972). For a review of SEC actions under rule 2(e) see generally
Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role,
and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE L.J. 968, 982-1011.
76. See, e.g., In re Seidman & Seidman, Release No. 34-12,752 (Sept. 1, 1976) (accounting

firm ordered not to undertake new audit engagements with publicly held companies for
six months as a result of allegedly improper procedures and techniques); In re Rudolph,
Palitz g&Co., Release No. AS-191 (March 30, 1976) (accounting firm censured pursuant
to rule 2(e) and suspended from practicing before SEC for 60 days as a result of negligent
actions); In re Schimmel, Admin. Proc. No. 12,254 (March 25, 1976) (attorney suspended
from practicing before SEC for 12 months for negligently failing to examine bank escrow

agreement).
77. See Ruder, supranote 10, at 632.
78. Compare Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970) with Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). Also Compare Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) with
Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973).
79. Apparently the SEC has already taken steps to conform with the Hochfelder
case. The SEC's Office of the General Counsel issued a memorandum to all staff attorneys

shortly after Hochfelder was decided concerning the impact of the case on future SEC
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and the SEC should be aware, however, that the direction of the Court in
recent rule lOb-5 actions has been unmistakable8s While the Forman v.
United Housing Foundation,81Blue Chip,82 and Hochfelders s cases provided
the Court with the opportunity to expand the scope of rule lOb-5, the Court
refused to do so and even narrowed the boundaries of rule lOb-5 in certain
respects.84 Consequently, if the courts and the SEC refuse to pay heed to this
direction and instead attempt to give expansive answers to the reckless
conduct and injunctive relief issues, the Supreme Court may well react
85
with a restrictive interpretation of both.
Rendering of Substantial Assistance
The third element of the aider and abettor test requires that substantial

enforcement actions. The memorandum suggested that references to knowing or willful
conduct should be avoided in future complaints in SEC injunctive actions so that the
Commission will not be required to meet more difficult standards of proof than needed.
The SEC noted that a California federal judge has already stated that he believed
that it is doubtful that simple negligence will be sufficient after Hochfelder to impose
lOb-5 liability in injunctive actions. SEC v. Geotek Resources Fund, Inc.,
F. Supp.
(D.C. N. Cal.), cited in, BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. No. 354 (May 26, 1976) (comments of Judge
Sweigert). However, the judge also noted that it is arguable that a lesser degree of
culpability is required in injunctive actions.
The memorandum also suggested that the staff avoid allegations of aiding and abetting
in which proof of knowledge will be difficult to produce. Since the Supreme Court failed
to address the question of whether civil liability could be imposed on aiders and abettors
under rule lOb-5, the Office of the General Counsel proposed that in drafting complaints
the focus should be on participation. SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder (April 26, 1976) BNA SEC. REc. L. REP. No. 354, F-I (May 26, 1976).
80. See notes 81-83 infra.
81. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Forman involved a class action by residents of a housing
cooperative who alleged that the cooperative information bulletin misrepresented to
purchasers that the developers would absorb future cost increases incurred in completing
the project. When the developers did not absorb these costs, plaintiffs filed suit under
rule lOb-5. In holding that the housing contract was not a security, which made rule
lOb-5 inapplicable, the Supreme Court gave a very narrow interpretation of investment
contract. See generally Comment, Securities Law: Tenant Shares in Nonprofit Cooperative
Apartments and the Federal Securities Laws, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 296 (1975).
82. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Birnbaum doctrine requires that the plaintiff in a rule
lOb-5 action be an actual purchaser or seller. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1952). This doctrine was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip.
Although the Supreme Court had never decided a case concerning the purchaser-seller
requirement, it had suggested that a broad interpretation would be given to purchaser and
seller. "[W]e must ask whether the respondents' alleged conduct is the type of fraudulent
behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the Rule lOb-5." SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 451, 467 (1969). This expansive view of rule lOb-5, however.
was apparently rejected by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip.
83. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
84. In Forman the Court narrowed the definition of profit in determining the existence
of a security under the Howey test. See generally Comment, supra note 81, at 301-05.
85. A restrictive interpretation of these issues would involve the Court's holding that
recklessness is not sufficient to impose rule lOb-5 liability and that negligence is not sufficient
to support an injunctive action under rule lOb-5.
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assistance be rendered to the primary participants. s 6 There has been a predictable difference of opinion between circuits as to what constitutes "substantial assistance." The major disagreement has focused on whether mere
silence or inaction under particular circumstances constitutes substantial
87
assistance.
The Third Circuit indicated in Landy v. FDIC88 that secondary liability
cannot be imposed for mere inaction unless a special relationship existed
between the defendant and plaintiff. In that case, a bank president had
used funds to engage in stock market speculation that proved to be unsuccessful. As a result of these transactions, plaintiff shareholders of the
bank brought an action premised on secondary liability against the brokerage
firms that had opened accounts and had executed transactions with the president in the bank's name. Contending that the brokerage firms had knowledge
that the president was engaged in some sort of fraudulent scheme, the
plaintiffs alleged that the brokers' failure to disclose information about the
president's activities to the bank's shareholders rendered substantial assistance
to the president's scheme. Rejecting this argument, the Third Circuit held
that the brokerage firms owed no affirmative duty of disclosure to the bank's
shareholders and thus could not be held liable for silence and inaction.8 9
The Third Circuit noted the case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Insurance Co., 0 in which the Seventh Circuit had held Midwestern liable for
failure to disclose its knowledge that a broker was fraudulently trading Midwestern stock. One critical factor in Brennan was that the fraudulent broker
was creating a beneficial market for Midwestern -a reason that could have
prompted Midwestern's silence. The Landy court distinguished Brennan by
noting that in Brennan the customers of the fraudulent broker had made
specific inquiries of Midwestern. In Landy, on the other hand, no such inquiries
had been made. Thus, the Landy court implied that the brokerage firms
could have been found liable if they had declined to disclose the information
86. In the usual case, in which silence or inaction is not involved, the courts have
generally looked to four factors to see if the assistance is substantial: 1) amount of assistance
given by defendant, 2) presence or absence at the time of the tort, 3) relation to
the other person, and 4) state of mind of the accused. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973); Fisher v. New York Stock Exchange, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
195,416 (SMD.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1976).
87. For cases that have found that silence and inaction alone are sufficient to create
liability, see Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969); Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ore. 1973); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705,
709 (D. Minn. 1968). Contra, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1973); Wessel
v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971).
88. 486 F.2d 139 (1973).
89. 486 F.2d at 163. Such a result would not be reached in some courts. In Fisher v.
New York Stock Exchange, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff95,416 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1976), the
court noted that a duty to disclose may arise solely on the basis of a failure to act. In
that case, the New York Stock Exchange had allegedly participated in a conspiracy of
silence to withhold negative information about its members from the investing public.
The court noted that an affirmative act is not needed and that silence alone is sufficient
under certain circumstances to constitute substantial assistance.
90. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1969).
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in response to specific shareholders' inquiries. This distinction is a poor basis
for allowing the brokerage firms in Landy to escape liability. The Landy court
acknowledged that the intent of the brokerage firms was not to assist the
president's fraud but to generate commissions from the president's mushrooming account. In other words, the court allowed the brokerage firms to
benefit directly and knowingly from the president's scheme without incurring
any liability as long as no bank shareholders investigated the president's
actions. Even without considering the special responsibilities brokers owe to
the investing public, 91 there is little justification for holding that silence and
inaction on the part of the brokerage firms in Landy did not constitute substantial assistance.
The Third Circuit is not alone in holding mere inaction and silence insufficient to impose aider and abettor liability. The Ninth Circuit has also
rendered a similar holding in Wessel v. Buhler.92 In that case, a certified
public accountant had been retained to prepare financial statements for a
chemical company. After completing the preliminary background investigation necessary to prepare the statements, the accountant discovered that the
company's books were seriously deficient. The prepared statements were
ultimately used in a prospectus that violated rule lOb-5. The plaintiffs' attempt
to hold the accountant liable for failing to advise the stockholders that the
company's books were in poor condition was rejected by the Ninth Circuit.
Although both cases resulted in failure to impose secondary liability, Wessel
is distinguishable from Landy. The Wessel court, noting that the accountant
had prepared the unaudited statements for purposes other than stock
issuance, pointed out that no evidence had been introduced showing that
the accountant was aware the statements might be used for prospectus purposes.
In Landy, on the other hand, the brokerage firms apparently had knowledge
of the president's fraudulent actions. Thus, the accountant's lack of awareness
of the fraudulent scheme justified the Wessel court's refusal to impose
secondary liability; to do otherwise would have effectively abandoned the
scienter requirement. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit might find inaction
sufficient to impose aider and abettor liability if it appears evident that the
defendant knowingly assisted the securities violation.
In contrast to the Third Circuit's approach in Landy, the Tenth Circuit
indicated in Kerbs v. River FallsIndustries,Inc. 9 3 that inaction was sufficient to
impose rule lOb-5 liability. In Kerbs the president of a company was charged
by plaintiffs with aiding and abetting a fraudulent scheme. The charge
stemmed from the fact that the president had attended a meeting where
the primary defendant had sold 25,000 nonexistent shares in the president's
company to the plaintiffs. The president denied liability, alleging that he
had merely been present at the meeting and had not said anything or
91.

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§11, 15, 15a, 15 U.S.C. §§78k, 78o (1971).

92. 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971). The Third Circuit had relied on Wessel in support of its
holding in Landy, finding that "the exposure of independent accountants and others to
such vistas of liability, limited only by the ingenuity of investors and their counsel, would
lead to serious mischief." 486 F.2d at 162.
93. 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
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otherwise encouraged the plaintiffs to buy the stock. Rejecting this defense,
the Kerbs court emphasized that the president knew the stock certificate was
phony and concluded that the defendant, as an insider, was under a duty to
disclose this information to the plaintiffs.9 However, the court did not state
whether this breach alone was sufficient to show substantial assistance since
it also noted that the president's attendance at the meeting gave the transaction
an aura of legitimacy. Thus, the Kerbs decision might best be viewed as
involving both silence and affirmative action.
In silence and inaction cases, a finding that substantial assistance was
rendered may be closely dependent on whether the accused had an affirmative
duty of disclosure. Unfortunately, courts are not in agreement in determining
the existence of a duty of disclosure. For example, this duty of disclosure has
been imposed on directors who participated in the allegedly illegal transaction,95 lawyers who authored opinion letters,98 and lead underwriters who
engaged in fraud.97 On the other hand, courts have refused to impose such a
duty on brokers who executed the primary defendant's fraudulent trans9
action,98 an accountant who prepared a company's financial statements, and
a supplier who provided consideration for an alleged fraudulent transaction
10 0
As long
between the purchasing company and its controlling shareholder.
as there is no expressed standard for determining the existence of a duty
of disclosure, considerable uncertainty will exist as to whether silence or
inaction may satisfy the substantial assistance requirement.
In addition to disagreement as to what constitutes substantial assistance,
there is a question as to whether the assistance must be knowingly given.
The Third Circuit apparently requires only that substantial assistance be
given.101 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, however, require that the assistance
be knowingly rendered. 0 2 In many cases, the ultimate decision as to liability
could differ depending on which test is imposed. For instance, it is possible

94. The court noted that "one who aids and abets a fraudulent scheme may be held

liable even though his assistance consists of mere silence or inaction." Id. at 740 (dictum).
95. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes
60-62. Although this case involved injunctive relief, a finding of the absence or presence
of a duty of disclosure should be equally applicable in damage and injunctive cases. See
generally Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws:
Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CALF. L. REv. 1189, 1220-28 (1973).

97. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Inc., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
98. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
99. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
100. Saltzman v. Zern, CCH FtD. SEC. L. REP. 95,521 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 1976).
101. See 486 F.2d at 163. The Landy court required three elements: the existence of
an independent wrong, knowledge by the accused of that wrong, and the rendering of
substantial assistance by the accused in effecting the wrongful act.
Whether the Third Circuit will strictly interpret this test is unclear. In Rochez Bros.
v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), the court inferred that the accused must knowingly

render substantial assistance. Id. at 886-87.
102.

See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey,

493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
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that a defendant might satisfy the scienter requirement without being aware
that he is rendering substantial assistance.
Finally, the question of what degree of knowledge must be shown is
further complicated in cases involving the rendering of substantial assistance
by silence or inaction. As was stated earlier, scienter is often inferred from
the circumstances of the case.10 3 Recognizing this, several courts have required
that the fraudulent intent be shown by reliable evidence. 1°4 The Sixth Circuit,
for instance, has held that silence or inaction may be a form of assistance
only when it can be shown that the accused consciously intended to aid
the violation. 05
The Sixth Circuit's test presents the problem of interpreting what is meant
by consciously intending. For example, if an individual knew of a securities
violation and was knowingly profiting from it, would his inaction be viewed
as conscious intent to aid the violation? The failure to interpret conscious
intent to cover such instances might result in an overly stringent standard
for imposing liability. The only apparent justification for not including
such instances would be the fear of expanding rule lOb-5 liability. 06 This
was the reason for imposing an even more stringent requirement in Woodward
v. Metro Bank,10 7 in which the Fifth Circuit held that a high conscious intent
should be shown to impose liability for silence.
In Woodward a bank had made a loan to an individual who later used
the funds in executing his fraudulent scheme. Plaintiffs attempted to hold
the bank liable on the theory that it should have known what the borrower
was doing with the funds. 'When analyzing the facts to see if a high conscious
intent existed, the court gave special attention to how ordinary the assisting
activity was in the defendant's business. In refusing to impose liability on
the bank in Woodward, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that the
bank's loan was an everyday transaction that did not involve any unusual
circumstances. Under this analysis, conscious intent is much more likely to be
found if the assisting activity is of an extraordinary nature and is less likely
to be found if the assistance is an everyday business transaction for the
accused. 08
On its face, the Fifth Circuit analysis might seem unduly restrictive since
such a test would presumably weigh against liability in a case like Landy in
103. See note 29 supra.
104. See note 102 supra.
105. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). This viewpoint has been
followed by other circuits. See, e.g., Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 142 F.2d 744, 745 (9th Cir.
1944); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.), 334 F.

Supp. 44 (D.C.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
106. In Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970), the court noted that
the maintenance of a viable business community requires that some limits be placed on
the scope of rule lOb-5.
107. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). It could be contended that conscious intent is
a state of mind not capable of being defined in varying degrees. The Fifth Circuit test,
however, merely seems to be inferring that it will require a higher degree of proof than
that required by the Sixth Circuit test.
108. Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizen v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (ordinary function of
transfer agent entailed no special duty).
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which the brokerage firms were merely engaging in everyday transactions.
However, this undesirable result would be avoided since the Fifth Circuit
noted that conscious intent would not be needed in cases in which a duty
of disclosure existed- a duty likely to be found in the Landy case. 09
CONCLUSION

The lower courts have significantly expanded the scope of secondary
liability under rule lOb-5 over the last few years. Despite expressions of concern pertaining to the adverse effects this expansion was having on the business
community,"x0 this trend reached its apparent culmination in 1975 when the
Seventh Circuit held that negligence on the part of secondary participants
was sufficient to impose rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability.:" The United
States Supreme Court, however, continuing its current policy of restrictively
interpreting rule lOb-5, 1 2 reversed that decision and held in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder that scienter was an essential element in private actions for
damages under rule lOb-5. 3
In light of that decision, the Fifth Circuit test employed in Woodward v.
Metro Bank" 4 appears to be the most satisfactory test for imposing aider and
abettor liability. Under that test, liability will be imposed only if it can be
shown that a securities violation had been committed by a third party, that
the accused had a general awareness of his role in the third party's improper
activity, and that the accused knowingly rendered substantial assistance. While
this test should be comforting to potential aider and abettor defendants since
liability will not be imposed unless the accused knowingly and substantially
assisted or participated in the fraud, the test should also adequately protect
investors. Because of the Fifth Circuit's recognition that attendant factors
might impose a duty of disclosure or might reduce the degree of knowledge
that must be proven, investors should have little fear of decisions similar to
Landy v. FDIC.-, Thus, the test satisfactorily accommodates the often conflicting policies of protecting the business community and investors alike.
CHARLEs L. HOFFMAN,

JR.

109. The Fifth Circuit noted that "a duty of disclosure may exist where any person
possesses inside information, or where the law imposes special obligations, as for accountants,
brokers, or other experts, depending on the circumstances of the case." Woodward v.
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 n.28 (1975).
110. See note 106 supra.
111. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (1974).
112. See notes 81-82 .supra.
113. 96 S. Ct. at 1375.
114. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
115. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
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